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Distrust and Clarify: Appreciating Congressional
Overrides
James J. Brudney
I.

*

Introduction

Deborah Widiss continues to make important contributions in an area of
statutory interpretation that has been largely neglected: the consequences of
congressional overrides. Professor Widiss previously demonstrated how the
Supreme Court and lower courts often confine the reach of statutes that
purposefully override prior court decisions, thereby reviving aspects of
the overridden judicial interpretations as ―shadow precedents.‖ 1
In
Undermining Congressional Overrides: The Hydra Problem in Statutory
Interpretation, 2 Professor Widiss addresses the Supreme Court‘s further
expansion of judicial power in the aftermath of congressional disapproval.
Faced with the override of its textual interpretation in one employment
discrimination statute, the Court inferred from this repudiation that it could
approach on a clean slate identical but unamended language in a closely
related statute. 3 Professor Widiss deftly demonstrates that the Court‘s
decision to ―grow a new head‖—ignoring both Congress‘s purpose when
enacting the override and the Court‘s own shadow precedent when

*

Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. I am grateful to Ethan Leib for very
helpful comments on an earlier draft. Thanks to Anthony Piccirillo for valuable research assistance
and to Cynthia Cameron for excellent secretarial support.
1
See Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the Separation of Powers: Statutory
Interpretation of Congressional Overrides, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV 511 (2009).
2
Deborah A. Widiss, Undermining Congressional Overrides: The Hydra Problem in Statutory
Interpretation, 90 TEXAS L. REV. 859 (2012).
3
See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc. 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2349, 2351–52 (2009) (Thomas, J.); id. at
2356 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For Professor Widiss‘s overview of Gross, see Widiss, supra note
2, at 888–93.
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construing the same language—is unjustified in separation-of-powers terms
and subversive from a rule-of-law perspective.4
Professor Widiss‘s analysis focuses on Supreme Court decisions in the
employment discrimination area. As she explains, the hydra and shadowprecedent problems are especially likely to arise in this field for two reasons:
numerous statutes addressing parallel antidiscrimination concerns tend to be
interpreted in pari materia, and overrides occur with some frequency.5 But
the Supreme Court‘s willingness to minimize or distort the meaning of
congressional overrides extends to other areas of law as well.6
My Response adopts a Congress-centered view of overrides. It starts
from a core premise that these overrides signify Congress‘s distrust of the
Court.7 Once Congress concludes that the traditional ―faithful agent‖ norm
for construing a statute 8 is inoperative, the breakdown has important
implications. When considering the meaning of an override enactment,
judges should discount the value of court-centered interpretive assets such as
ordinary language analysis or the canons of construction. Indeed, judicial
reliance on these textualist resources is often associated with overrides in the
first instance.9 Rather, courts construing new text that reflects Congress‘s
disapproval of prior judicial interpretation should pay particular attention to
congressionally generated evidence explaining the nature and contours of
that disapproval. This evidence may appear in a textual statement of
findings and purpose, but it is more likely to be part of a conference report,
committee report, or other legislative history.
Professor Widiss‘s proposed solution to the hydra problem calls for
courts to adopt a canon-like rebuttable presumption, applying Congress‘s
signaled meaning to shared language ―so long as the [text in question] can

4

See Widiss, supra note 2, at 890–900, 908–26.
Id. at 878–79; Widiss supra note 1, at 536–37.
6
See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005) (construing override
text that revised a federal jurisdiction statute); Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12 (2000)
(construing override text that revised a criminal law statute); Gutierrez De Martinez v. Lamagno,
515 U.S. 417 (1995) (construing override text that revised a sovereign immunity statute).
7
My focus, like that of Professor Widiss, is on overrides of Supreme Court decisions occurring in a
relatively short time frame, typically five years or less.
8
It is well recognized that ―[i]n the domain of statutory interpretation, Congress is the master.‖ W.
Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 115 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See Widiss,
supra note 1, at 518–20.
9
See Daniel J. Bussel, Textualism’s Failures: A Study of Overruled Bankruptcy Decisions 53
VAND. L. REV. 887, 900–10 (2009) (reporting that a disproportionate number of federal court
decisions interpreting bankruptcy statutes from 1979 to 1998 that were overridden by Congress
relied on the textualist method); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory
Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 347–48 (1991) (reporting that nearly half the overrides
from 1967 to 1990 address decisions in which the Court‘s primary reasoning was based on plain
meaning or canons of construction, whereas overrides based on statutory purpose are rare); see
FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 82 (2009)
(summarizing findings from various studies).
5

2012]

Response

207

reasonably bear‖ the meaning Congress has identified. 10 In the override
setting, this approach seems unduly deferential to the judicial branch.
Professor Widiss recognizes that it is hazardous to trust that courts will
undertake responsible statutory interpretation on an issue where they have
already acted irresponsibly in Congress‘s eyes.11
My proposal would tether courts more closely to Congress‘s
expressions of purpose and intent when construing its amended text. As
explained below, legislative history accompanying congressional overrides is
especially likely to reflect Congress‘s institutional views. Any risk that the
formulation of these congressional expressions will be unrepresentative or
insincere is minimal and can be readily controlled. Moreover, legislative
record evidence accompanying override text aptly illustrates why the larger
debate about legislative history as an interpretive resource should focus on
which factors lend it greater or lesser probative weight, rather than on
shopworn arguments about threshold admissibility.
Part II explains the interbranch implications of overrides, and why
Congress‘s attitude toward a court it has overridden is appropriately one of
distrust. Part III considers the options before Congress for alleviating its
distrust by clarifying any ambiguity or silence regarding the scope of an
override. I agree with Professor Widiss that textual clarification is generally
not a realistic alternative. I then discuss why canons or presumptions are no
more practicable, and why purposive statements and legislative history—
subject to adequate review—should be the preferred option.
II.

Congress‘s Expression of Distrust

The Court’s Failure as Faithful Agent
The basic constitutional conception of legislative supremacy views
Congress as vested with supreme policy-making authority under Article I.
The Court‘s role in legislative matters is to serve as an honest agent,
construing and enforcing the policy directives embodied in statutes.12 This
notion of an honest or faithful agent obviously understates the challenges that
judges face when interpreting federal laws. Textualists, intentionalists, and
purposivists all agree on the importance of deferring to congressional
authority. They differ considerably on the proper approach to their
deferential task and, in particular, on how judges may best respect the
supremacy of Congress.13 Still, notwithstanding such differences, there is
A.

10

Widiss, supra note 2, at 933.
See id. at 938.
12
See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 79
(2001).
13
Compare, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 14–37 (1997) (arguing that textualism and semantic resources best respect legislative
supremacy), and John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists, 106 COLUM. L.
11
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broad judicial consensus on the need to carry out congressional directives
subject to possible extrinsic limits imposed by the Constitution.
When Congress amends the law to codify rejection of a Supreme Court
decision, 14 it concludes that the faithful agent norm has been breached.
Override legislation should be viewed as a distinctive subset of lawmaking in
general for two reasons. The first is that legislators focus on the work of the
judicial branch from a self-consciously institutional perspective. Most
problems that capture the attention of the policy community working in and
around Congress derive from a broad set of economic, social, scientific,
or moral concerns. Solutions to these complex problems typically are
proposed by an array of interested entities and individuals with whom
Congress regularly interacts. The politics of lawmaking often requires a
series of compromise arrangements in order to accommodate these various
competing interests.
By contrast, the typical problem giving rise to override legislation is a
particular Court decision that the current Congress concludes has erroneously
applied a prior congressional rule, standard, prohibition, or entitlement.
Legislators are responding in constitutionally aware terms to the exercise of
power by a coordinate branch. Their response is to develop and express an
understanding of how their own institutional authority has been trammeled as
part of correcting what they view as the transgression. For this purpose,
Congress, and especially the standing committees with subject matter
jurisdiction, tend to devote sustained attention to the judicial decision at
issue, including a close examination of its reasoning and holding.
The second distinctive trait of override laws is that Congress conveys its
considered disapproval of Court action. This disapproval may on occasion
be communicated in measured terms, but more often the tone is critical,
didactic, or angry.
Congress’s View of the Court’s Failure
As illustrated by the following sample of deliberative statements
excerpted from congressional findings, committee reports, and floor
statements, Congress does not mince words when enacting an override
statute,
 The conferees agree that the purpose of the amendment to
section 4(f)(2) is to make absolutely clear . . . that the
exception does not authorize an employer to require or
B.

REV. 70, 99, 102–03 (2006) (same), with Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in
Interpreting Statues, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 848–64 (1992) (arguing that intentionalism and
purposive resources must be part of respect for legislative supremacy), and James J. Brudney,
Canon Shortfalls and the Virtues of Political Branch Interpretive Assets, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1199,
1223–24 (2010) (same).
14
Like Professor Widiss, I focus on overrides of Supreme Court decisions, although what follows
is applicable to overrides of lower courts.
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permit involuntary retirement of an employee within the
protected age group on account of age. In McMann v.
United Airlines, 98 S. Ct. 244 (1977), the Supreme Court
held to the contrary. . . . The conferees specifically disagree
with the Supreme Court‘s holding and reasoning in that case.
Plan provisions in effect prior to the date of enactment are
not exempt under section 4(f)(2) by virtue of the fact that
they antedate the act or these amendments.15
[I]n Finley v United States, 109 S. Ct. 2003 (1989), the
Supreme Court cast substantial doubt on the authority of the
federal courts to hear some claims within supplemental
jurisdiction. . . . This section would authorize jurisdiction
in a case like Finley, as well as essentially restore the preFinley understandings of the authorization for and limits on
other forms of supplemental jurisdiction.16
Where, as was alleged in [Lorance v. AT&T Technologies
Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989)], an employer adopts a rule or
decision with an unlawful discriminatory motive, each
application of that rule or decision is a new violation of the
law. . . . 17 This legislation should be interpreted as
disapproving the extension of [Lorance] to contexts outside
of seniority systems.18
[T]he Supreme Court‘s decision [in Bailey v. United States,
516 U.S. 137 (1995)] that ―use‖ requires ―active
employment‖ has had a significant impact upon federal drug
and violent crime prosecutions and convictions across the
country. . . . H.R. 424 . . . replaces [the words ―uses‖ or
―carries‖] with a graded penalty structure for possessing,
brandishing or discharging a firearm. The word ―possession‖
has a broader meaning than either ―uses‖ or ―carries,‖ thus
reversing the restrictive effect of the Bailey decision.19
Once again, the Committee intends to overturn the erroneous
interpretation of the Supreme Court [as to the meaning of
―subterfuge to evade the purposes of‖ The Age

H.R. REP. NO. 95-950 at 8 (1978) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 528, 529
(accompanying the Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95256).
16
H.R. REP. NO. 101-734 at 28 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860, 6874 (accompanying
the Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650).
17
S. REP. NO. 101-315, pt. 6, at 54 (1990) (accompanying Civil Rights Act of 1990).
18
137 CONG. REC. 29,047 (1991) (Sponsors‘ Interpretive Memorandum) (accompanying The Civil
Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006)).
19
H.R. REP. NO. 105-344, at 5–6 (1997) (accompanying Pub. L. No. 105-386 (1997), To Provide
for Increased Mandatory Minimum Sentences for Criminals Possessing Firearms, and for Other
Purposes).
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Discrimination in Employment Act]. . . . The Committee
regrets that the Supreme Court in [Public Employees
Retirement System of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989)]
chose not to credit the language of the 1978 Conference
Report [accompanying an earlier override], language that
appeared in the Congressional Record and was
overwhelmingly approved by both Houses of Congress.
The Committee hopes that in the future, the Supreme Court
will take more seriously such expressions of legislative
intent. . . .20
 The Supreme Court in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., [550 U.S. 618 (2007)], significantly impairs statutory
protections against discrimination in compensation that
Congress established and that have been bedrock principles
of American law for decades. The Ledbetter decision
undermines those statutory protections by unduly restricting
the time period in which victims of discrimination can
challenge and recover for discriminatory compensation
decisions or other practices, contrary to the intent of
Congress.21
This series of excerpts indicates how Congress—directly and through its
designated deliberative agents—elaborates in reasoned terms its
disappointment with Court decisions. In many instances, the override
Congress asserts that the enacting Congress would have disapproved as
well.22 Assertions about the intent of an earlier Congress cannot be proven,
and they have occasionally given rise to debate as to whether statutory law is
being restored or created.23 Such debate, however, ought not to obscure a
basic truth concerning interbranch dialogue in this setting.
Congress determining that the Court erred on a matter of statutory
interpretation is analogous to the Court holding that Congress acted in
violation of the Constitution. This analogy holds regardless of whether the
sanctioning branch purports to act in a restorative or creative manner. In the
override setting, the Justices presumably believe they have been faithful to
the enacting Congress, and they may even conclude the Court is a victim of

20

S. Rep. No. 101-263, at 29 (1990) (accompanying Pub. L. No. 101-433, Older Workers Benefit
Protection Act of 1990).
21
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 2 (2009).
22
See H.R. REP. NO. 110-237, at 15 (2007) (asserting that the 1991 Congress would have rejected
the Court‘s decision in Ledbetter); H.R. REP. NO. 103-652, at 169 (1994) (Conf. Rep.) (asserting
that override of the Court‘s decision in Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994), restores
original congressional intent).
23
See, e.g., Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 304–07 (1994) (discussing the possible
retroactive effect of the 1991 Civil Rights Act override purporting to restore prior law); West Va.
Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 101 (1991) (criticizing judicial efforts to reconcile or
eliminate inconsistencies on a particular subject between earlier and later congresses).
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bait-and-switch because the override Congress has a new and different intent.
The same dynamic occurs when the Court invalidates an act of Congress.
The Justices assert—expressly or implicitly—that invalidation vindicates the
supremacy of the Constitution as a steady and seamless source of meaning,
while Congress may believe—at times with justification—that it has been
victimized by the bait-and-switch of a new constitutional direction.24
When one branch negates the considered judgment of another, its
message reflects confidence in an area of superior authority. 25 That
message, typically delivered in a somber or stern tone, also serves as a
reminder to the rebuked branch that a degree of humility is appropriate. Not
surprisingly, the rebuked branch may initially bridle at such a reminder.
When the Court invalidates a statute, members of Congress often react with
expressions of anger or hostility.26 Ultimately, if Congress decides to revisit
the policy area at issue, it does so based on careful attention to the Court‘s
earlier reasoning. This attention is likely to reflect both pragmatic interest in
avoiding a second invalidation and a certain respect (albeit at times grudging)
for the Court‘s authority in construing and applying the Constitution.
When Congress overrides a Supreme Court decision, the reaction of the
Court is not immediately apparent. The Justices rarely express substantive
views outside their opinions, and it typically takes many years before the
override statute gives rise to a controversy that reaches the Court. Certain
justices have suggested that overrides are part of respectful discourse
between the Court and Congress,27 and at times, the Court‘s concern to avoid
constitutional issues leads it to invite congressional clarification even if this
24

See Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80, 98–115 (2001)
(demonstrating how the Court after 1995 dramatically altered its approach to reviewing
constitutionality of federal statutes under both the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
25
Cf. Emily Hammond Meazell, Deference and Dialogue in Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L.
REV. 1722 (2011) (discussing serial litigation as a form of ongoing dialogue between agencies and
courts). Agency–court dialogue differs from the Congress–Court override setting in important
respects. The agency is not ―master of a domain‖ in the same way as Congress is under Article I,
as evidenced, inter alia, by modern ―hard-look‖ review under the Administrative Procedure Act.
See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass‘n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42
(1983); Greater Bos. Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Further,
dialogue between a court and an agency is typically more tightly confined, focusing on evidence or
reasoning for a single agency rule, not analogous circumstances.
26
See, e.g., 156 CONG. REC. H3443 (daily ed. May 13, 2010) (statement of Rep. Heinrich calling
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) a ―slap in the face‖); 156 CONG. REC. S274–76 (daily
ed. Jan. 28, 2010) (statement of Sen. Leahy, sharply critical of the Court‘s decision in Citizens
United); 136 CONG. REC. S8643 (daily ed. June 25, 1990) (statement of Sen. Helms decrying
Court‘s decision in United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990)); 136 CONG. REC. H4014–15
(daily ed. June 21, 1990) (statement of Rep. Clement stating that great patriots would decry the
Court‘s decision in Eichman).
27
See James J. Brudney, The Supreme Court as Interstitial Actor: Justice Ginsburg’s Eclectic
Approach to Statutory Interpretation, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 889, 911 (discussing Justice Ginsburg‘s
emphasis on the importance of dialogue rather than diatribe in relations with Congress); id. at 915
(discussing specific Ginsburg opinions inviting congressional response).
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results in an override.28 At other times, though, the Court‘s approach seems
to verge on arrogance: override follows judicial insistence that the text is so
clear the Court need not consult contextual evidence of Congress‘s purpose
or intent.29
Even if—perhaps especially if—the Court was initially overbearing or
prideful about its interpretive approach, a proper respect for Congress‘s
superior authority should lead the Justices to pay close attention to
Congress‘s override reasoning when construing the subsequent statute. An
override signifies that the Court has mischaracterized Congress‘s enacted
meaning as conceived by the override legislators. That context frames the
Court‘s second-stage interpretative task, which is to understand and absorb
the full extent of its error. Legislative history can be highly salient in this
regard because it helps unpack the nature and contours of Congress‘s
admonishment.30
Admittedly, when a controversy involving the meaning of any statute
reaches the Court, there are likely to be plausible arguments on each side.
Assuming some gap or ambiguity in the override text, the Court must choose
to rely on inferences from legislative silence or inaction, on the canons of
construction, or on legislative history. From Congress‘s standpoint, the
override context makes the first two interpretive assets suspect and the third
one more reliable.
III. Congress‘s Options to Clarify
As scholars in law and political science have observed, Congress has
become more inclined to override Court decisions since the early 1970s. 31
Factors contributing to heightened legislative scrutiny of federal court
decisions include the expansion of professional committee staffs, Congress‘s

28

See generally Lori Hausegger & Lawrence Baum, Inviting Congressional Action: A Study of
Supreme Court Motivations in Statutory Interpretation, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 162 (1999).
29
See, e.g., Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147–48 (1994); West Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v.
Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 100–01 (1991); Pub. Emp. Ret. Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 168
(1989).
30
See Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 425–26 (1995). See generally Cheryl
Boudreau et. al., What Statutes Mean: Interpretive Lessons from Positive Theories of
Communication and Legislation, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 957 (2007).
31
E.g. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2, 122 Stat. 3553, 3553–54
(overriding two Supreme Court decisions construing the ADA); Act of Nov. 13, 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-386, § 1, 112 Stat. 3469, 3469–70 (overriding the Bailey decision); see also Eskridge, Jr., supra
note 9, at 338 (reporting data indicating that Congress overrode 5.7 Supreme Court decisions on
average for each Congress from 1967-1974, but 12.6 decisions per Congress from 1975-1990); Lori
Hausegger & Lawrence Baum, Behind the Scenes: The Supreme Court and Congress in Statutory
Interpretation, in GREAT THEATRE: THE AMERICAN CONGRESS IN THE 1990S 224, 228 (1998)
(discussing overrides through 1996); Nancy C. Staudt et al., Judicial Decisions as Legislation:
Congressional Oversight of Supreme Court Tax Cases 1954–2005, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1340, 1352–
54 (2007) (reporting that 20% of Court‘s 279 tax decisions in this period triggered an override
proposal, and 8% (22 proposals) were enacted).
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growing mistrust of the judicial branch, and the emerging recognition of
statutes as fundamental norms of governance. 32 Professor Widiss has
identified two key interpretive questions faced by courts in the aftermath of
these overrides.
First, does Congress‘s correction of a judicial approach when it revises a
statutory provision with respect to one form of conduct carry over to other
related forms of conduct covered under the same statutory provision? For
instance, when Congress decides that pre-Act employee benefit plans
permitting involuntary retirement unlawfully evade the purposes of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, should the revised law extend to other
components of pre-Act benefit plans as unlawfully evasive? 33 When
Congress decides that the criminal code prohibition against obtaining
property by means of fraudulent pretenses applies to the intangible property
right to honest services, should the amended law apply to other
nontraditional forms of property such as government licenses? 34 Second,
does Congress‘s correction of a judicial approach when it revises a provision
in one statute carry over to identical or very similar language in other related
statutes?35
Both of these interpretive questions implicate the meaning of legislative
silence or inaction. When Congress is focused on correcting what it
perceives as judicial error, why does it not do so in text for related conduct
under the same textual provision or for the same conduct in related statutes?
And if it fails to include text for these related areas, why should courts
extrapolate from Congress‘s override reasoning, rather than relying on
language or structure canons such as expressio unius and ―meaningful
variation‖ to limit Congress‘s override to its precise terms?
A.

Limitations of Legislative Silence

In understanding why override text may well not capture the full scope
of Congress‘s disapproval, it is necessary to consider the time frame and
context in which an override Congress operates. When rejecting a Court
decision, Congress is likely to focus initially on what the Court actually held.
Congress‘s obliteration of the judicial result may simply reflect its
conclusion that it has done all that was necessary in text under the
32

See JEB BARNES, OVERRULED? LEGISLATIVE OVERRIDES, PLURALISM, AND CONTEMPORARY
COURT–CONGRESS RELATIONS 43 (2004); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A
REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 5–8 (2010).
33
See S. REP. NO. 101-263 at 4, 10 (1990) (discussing the meaning of the 1978 ADEA override
provision as extending beyond involuntary retirement to other pre-Act benefit plan provisions).
34
See Public Corruption Prosecution Improvements Act, S. 401, 112th Cong. (2011) (cosponsored
by Senators Leahy (D.) and Cornyn (R.), among others) (seeking to override Cleveland v. United
States, 531 U.S. 12 (2000), by amending the related mail fraud statute).
35
This question leads to the problem presented in Gross, although as Professor Widiss notes, it is a
variation on the challenge of discerning the scope and contours of congressional disapproval.
Widiss, supra note 2, at 875–79.
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circumstances. By adopting a prudent approach with respect to its allocation
of lawmaking resources, Congress maximizes its ability to address other
important legislative business given the well-recognized institutional
constraints on its time and political capital.36
In addition, there are important reasons why an override Congress will
be unable or unwilling to anticipate a series of collateral consequences in
textual terms. One is an inescapable lack of awareness as to future policy
developments covered by the text. Legislators overriding a Court decision
are unlikely to be able to foresee decades in advance which new forms of
property may be fraudulently obtained, or how new components of
employee-benefit plans may be discriminatorily administered. 37
No
inference should be drawn from Congress‘s de facto decision to eschew any
such efforts at clairvoyance.
Indeed, Congress‘s committee-based lawmaking structure may at times
result in an override Congress failing to recognize subtle differences in
contemporaneous textual formulation of shared policy objectives. To take a
notable example, standing committees in the mid-1970s drafted a number of
new environmental and energy statutes regulating technical and scientific
subject matter. Those laws identified expert witness fees separately from
attorney fees as part of fee-shifting remedial provisions in the lengthy
regulatory text. 38 A different standing committee in the same Congress,
drafting stand-alone text focused on overriding a Court decision in order to
shift fees for prevailing plaintiffs in civil rights cases, failed to refer
explicitly to expert witnesses.39 Despite ample legislative-history evidence
that the drafters sought to cover the full costs of vindicating civil rights in the
litigation process, Congress was forced to enact a second override text to
clarify that expert witness fees were recoverable.40
36

See James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of Statutes: Idle
Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1, 21–26, 84–85 (1994).
37
See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603, 102 Stat. 4181, 4508
(overriding McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987), on the right to honest services without
specifically addressing other intangible property rights); Age Discrimination in Employment Act
Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 2, 92 Stat. 189, 189 (overriding United Air Lines, Inc.
v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192 (1977) on involuntary retirement without specifically addressing other
benefit plan components).
38
Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469, §§ 19(d), 20(c)(2), 90 Stat. 2003, 2039–40
(1976) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2618(d), 2619(c)(2) (2006)); Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, § 7002(e), 90 Stat. 2795, 2826 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e)
(2006)); Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-477, § 17(e), 90
Stat. 2073, 2076 (codified at 49 U.S.C. app. § 1686(e) (2006)).
39
See West Va. Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 108–11 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (observing
that ―[t]he Senate Report on the Civil Rights Attorney‘s Fees Awards Act of 1976 explained that the
purpose of the proposed amendment to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 was ‗to remedy anomalous gaps in our
civil rights laws created by the United States Supreme Court‘s recent decision‘‖ in Alyeska Pipeline
Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc‘y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975)).
40
Compare West Va. Univ. Hospitals v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 88–89 (1991) (Scalia, J.) (relying on
fee-shifting language from other statutes), with id. at 110 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (relying on the
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Apart from lack of awareness, an override Congress may conclude that
it is too awkward or difficult to codify in anticipation of future controversies.
Given the legislative goal of offering useful guidance to judges, agencies,
and practicing attorneys, the override Congress may opt for flexible language
in order to lessen the chances for erroneous or absurd applications of an
overly detailed text. For example, in the complex area of supplemental
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367,41 civil procedure scholars maintained
that trying to address ―all the foreseeables‖ as part of an override was likely
to yield a text that is ―too prolix and baroque for everyday use.‖42 Congress
in 1990 settled for a text that was ―concededly not perfect‖ but that did
manage ―to change the direction taken by the Supreme Court in Finley [v.
United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989) and] to provide basic guidance (in
particular the legislative history‘s general approval of pre-Finley case
law . . .).‖43
Finally, an override Congress may sensibly decide that when identifying
some but not all instances of related conduct or related statutes, it risks
opening a Pandora‘s Box of unpalatable consequences. As Professor Widiss
observes, courts have been willing to draw negative inferences when
Congress modifies a closely analogous statute in certain respects but not
others, or modifies several comparably worded statutes while leaving
additional similar statutes unchanged.44 Such inferences in effect ascribe to
the override Congress a level of omniscience that is highly dubious as a
general matter. 45 These negative inferences seem especially disrespectful
when Congress has upbraided a court for excessive devotion to literal
meaning in the first instance.46
Courts and commentators have long raised concerns about attributing
any legal significance to legislative silence. 47 Gaps in text may carry

legislative history of the statute at issue). For floor statements from bill managers in both houses,
see 122 CONG. REC. 31471 (Sens. Scott and Mathias); 33313–14 (Sen. Tunney); 35122–23 (Rep.
Drinan). For the override of Casey, see Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 113(b),
105 Stat. 1071, 1079.
41
See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2006) (granting supplemental jurisdiction over other claims within the
same case or controversy over which the district courts have original jurisdiction).
42
Thomas D. Rowe et al., Compounding or Creating Confusion About Supplemental Jurisdiction?
A Reply to Professor Freer, 40 EMORY L.J. 943, 961 (1991).
43
Id.
44
See Widiss, supra note 2, at 893–900 (discussing the 1991 CRA and a single minor Amendment
to the ADEA); id. at 923 n.371 (discussing the 2009 Ledbetter Act that amended four statutes but
not the FMLA).
45
See supra notes 37–40 and associated text (describing examples of override Congresses that
lacked foresight). See generally William W. Buzbee, The One-Congress Fiction in Statutory
Interpretation,149 U. PA. L. REV. 171 (2000) (explaining that it is unrealistic to assume that
Congress is like a single draftsman that knows about all other enacted statutes when it modifies a
single law).
46
See supra note 9.
47
See Prostar v. Massachi, 239 F.3d 669, 678 (5th Cir. 2001) (pointing out that congressional
silence is not a good interpretive guide because it could be caused by ―unawareness, preoccupation,
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probative weight in certain limited circumstances,48 but for all the reasons
discussed above, these gaps are weak candidates to be given presumptive
significance in an override setting.
B.

Shortcomings of the Canons

Language canons, resting on the problematic assumption that statutes
can be self-defining, 49 are also an unsatisfactory option in the override
context. As background norms, they allow courts to assign controlling
weight to what judges regard as conventional usage. The privileging of
courts‘ linguistic puzzle-solving abilities over Congress‘s efforts at
deliberative communication during the lawmaking process is troubling in this
setting. While one may accept arguendo that courts as a general matter do
not act primarily from ideological motives, judicial policy preferences loom
larger in areas of override frequency such as civil rights and criminal law.50
Courts surely do care about institutional legitimacy, as Professor Widiss
observes, 51 but the pattern of overrides with respect to civil rights and
criminal statutes suggests that the Justices‘ ideological orientation may not
infrequently trump institutional concerns.52
Beyond such general considerations, there are familiar problems with
the particular language canons touted as clarifying override texts. The
expressio unius canon is invoked to provide meaning when an override
Congress modifies regulation of one item under a statutory provision yet not
others. But this canon presumes a level of congressional awareness and

or paralysis‖). See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH.
L. REV. 67 (1988); Daniel L. Rotenberg, Congressional Silence in the Supreme Court, 47 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 375 (1992).
48
See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 600 (1983) (attributing significance to
nonaction by Congress); Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara Cnty., Cal., 480 U.S. 616, 629 n.7
(1987) (same).
49
See Philip P. Frickey, Faithful Interpretation, 73 WASH. U. L. Q. 1085, 1089 (1995).
50
See Eskridge, Jr., supra note 9, at 344 (reporting that 15% of congressional overrides from 1967–
1990 involved criminal law; civil rights and antitrust were the next highest subject areas at 9%
each). For subsequent overrides in the criminal and civil rights areas, see, e.g., note 21 (addressing
a 2009 override in civil rights) and note 31 (addressing 1994 and 1997 overrides in criminal law and
2008 override in civil rights).
51
See Widiss, supra note 2, at 938.
52
With respect to civil rights, it is noteworthy that the early Rehnquist Court was overridden on
numerous high profile decisions in the 1990 Older Workers Benefit Protection Act and the 1991
Civil Rights Act, and the Roberts Court in its initial period suffered a similar well publicized fate in
the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009. The overridden decisions generally relied on language
canons and rejected or ignored legislative history. See Pub. Emp. Ret. Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492
U.S. 158, 168 (1989); West Va. Univ. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 99 (1991); Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 661 (2007) (Ginsburg, J. dissenting); Casey, at 115 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (―In the domain of statutory interpretation, Congress is the master. It obviously has the
power to correct our mistakes, but we do the country a disservice when we needlessly ignore
persuasive evidence of Congress‘ actual purpose and require it ‗to take the time to revisit the matter‘
and to restate its purpose in more precise English whenever its work product suffers from an
omission or inadvertent error.‖).
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comprehensive foresight in the drafting process that is questionable when
Congress is focused on rejecting a particular judicial outcome.53 Similarly,
the ―meaningful variation‖ canon is relied on to justify an inference that
Congress knowingly limited its error correction to conduct in a single statute.
As Professor Widiss convincingly explains, this inference of intentionality is
generally unwarranted. 54 Finally, there is the ―whole code‖ canon,
encouraging courts to ascribe consistent meaning to certain terms that appear
in unrelated titles of the U.S. Code.55 Such reliance on remote interstatutory
references has been singled out for criticism because it is so clearly prone to
judicial manipulation (and also because it can unsettle bodies of federal law
not before a court).56 The Supreme Court‘s reliance in Gross on language
from statutes addressing organized crime and consumer protection to
determine the meaning of ADEA text is a classic instance of such subjective,
ends-oriented analysis.57
In contrast to the language canons invoked regularly by the Supreme
Court to shape the meaning of override statutes, Professor Widiss‘s proposed
canonical presumption is more sensitive to this setting. Nonetheless, her
suggestion—for a fresh interpretation that is ―consistent with the meaning
Congress signaled it ascribes to the relevant language, so long as the
preexisting language can reasonably bear such meaning‖58 —would allow
courts to trump Congress‘s signals based on judges‘ own version of what is
reasonable textual analysis. Implicit in Professor Widiss‘s presumption is a
belief that Congress can define the scope of its override in sufficiently
concrete textual terms, and that courts will act faithfully to implement its
more concrete definitional approach.59 In the override context, this level of
trust is laudable but misplaced. As we have already seen, Congress has a
range of sound reasons to be less than fully concrete in its override text, and
courts in the override setting have established a record of deviating from
their role as faithful agent.60
C.

Potential of Legislative History
This is not the place to revisit at length arguments about why legislative
history is pragmatically valuable or constitutionally privileged as an

53

See supra text accompanying notes 36–46; RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS
(1985).
See Widiss, supra note 2, at 874.
55
See Buzbee, supra note 45, at 221; Widiss, supra note 2, at 874.
56
Buzbee, supra note 45, at 234–40.
57
See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (2009); Widiss, supra note 2, at 875.
58
Widiss, supra note 2, at 933 (emphasis added).
59
Id. at 933–38.
60
See supra text accompanying notes 15–21 (reproducing six examples of congressional criticism
of Supreme Court reasoning as part of the override process); supra note 31 and accompanying text
(discussing the substantial increase in overrides since 1974).
AND REFORM 277–82
54
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interpretive asset. 61 Judges and scholars advocating for its use recognize
that the reliability of legislative record evidence in any given case depends
on its level of presumptive trustworthiness for members who were seeking to
understand the text on which they voted. Because the primary audience for
explanations of bill support found in committee reports and key floor
statements is other legislators and their staffs, the question responsible judges
effectively ask is how likely these explanations are to have been noticed,
understood, and accepted by the prototypical ―reasonable member of
Congress‖ who voted for enactment.62
Professor Widiss has warned that in our textualist era, many judges
construing override language refuse to consult legislative history at all.63 I
will bracket for now the possibility that such a categorical refusal to consider
Congress‘s designated work product amounts to gravely irresponsible
judicial behavior. 64
Even for legislative history skeptics, however,
expressions of disapproval accompanying a congressional override are
worthy of serious attention.
For a start, consider that traditional pragmatic concerns—stemming
from the perceived risk of manipulative insertion or readily overlooked
commentary—will have little or no foundation. An override provision is a
direct, institutionally conscious response to a judicial decision. In rejecting
the court‘s position, Congress critically engages both the court‘s holding and
its reasoning. As the excerpts in subpart II(B) make clear, override
legislative history is focused on explaining and elaborating congressional
disapproval. It seems perverse for any court to ignore entirely such detailed
discussion of what an override provision is meant to accomplish.
The presumptive relevance of override legislative history does not mean
that all such history is equally probative. Several questions should be
considered when assigning appropriate weight to committee report or floor
commentary amplifying the basis of Congress‘s disapproval. One factor is
whether the override text itself was controversial or divisive among
members. If legislators are deeply divided on the scope of what is being
overridden, legislative history explaining the override is not likely to reflect
institutional consensus.65 Conversely, if legislators are unanimous or close

61

See generally Boudreau et. al., supra note 30; Breyer, supra note 13; Brudney, supra note 13.
This is the same prototypical reasonable member who, ―by a benign fiction,‖ is assumed to
understand both ordinary linguistic meaning and the surrounding body of law into which a text must
be integrated. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); see Brudney, supra note 36, at 76–78.
63
See Widiss, supra note 1, at 563.
64
See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Warp and Woof of Statutory Interpretation:
Comparing Supreme Court Approaches in Tax Law and Workplace Law, 58 DUKE L.J. 1231, 1292–
94 & n.249 (2009) (reporting positions taken by numerous senators from both parties that courts
should pay attention to legislative history as a general matter).
65
A classic example is legislative history accompanying the 1991 Civil Rights Act override of
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). See 137 CONG. REC. 28855–56 (1991)
62
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to unanimous, then explanations summarizing the purpose or meaning of
override text deserve to be taken more seriously.66
A second factor is whether the override commentary is expressed in
readily comprehensible terms. The more clearly a committee report or floor
explanation elaborates on the intended scope or contours of an override, the
more weight courts should attach. One example is the 1978 conference
report that accompanied override of McMann stating that ―[t]he conferees
specifically disagree with the Supreme Court‘s holding and reasoning,‖ and
then explaining that no benefit plan provisions are exempt from the Act
―[simply] by virtue of the fact they antedate the act or these amendments.‖67
Another example, emphasized by Professor Widiss, is the House committee
report accompanying the 1991 Civil Rights Act. Judiciary committee
members made clear their intention that the amendment to Title VII
overriding Price Waterhouse should be used by courts as a basis for
construing mixed-motive provisions in numerous other workplace
antidiscrimination laws that had regularly been interpreted as consistent with
Title VII.68 Although these two illustrations involve override commentary
setting forth a broad scope, Congress also may express a clear intent that
override text be narrowly applied. In overriding the Court‘s Finley decision
in 1990, Congress stated in both committee reports that the text was meant to
reject only that decision while otherwise codifying and preserving pre-Finley
understandings as to the contours and limits on supplemental jurisdiction.69

(statement of Sen. Danforth) (noting the conflicting interpretive memoranda inserted in the
Congressional Record on the precise meaning of the Wards Cove override provisions, and adding ―a
court would be well advised to take with a large grain of salt floor debate and statements placed into
the Congressional Record which purport to create an interpretation for the legislation that is before
us‖).
66
For example, the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650 (overriding the Finley
decision) passed the House by a vote of 87–18 and passed the Senate by voice vote. See Bill
Summary and Status 95th Congress (1977-78) HR 5383 THOMAS (LIBRARY OF CONGRESS),
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d101:HR05316:@@@X. The Age Discrimination in
Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, 92 Stat. 189 (overriding the decision in
United Airlines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192 (1977)), passed the House by a vote of 359–4 and
passed the Senate by a vote of 88–7. See Bill Summary and Status, 95th Congress (1977 - 1978),
HR5383, THOMAS (LIBRARY OF CONGRESS). While the risk of strategically planted explanations
exists even for near-unanimously approved laws, it is de minimis with respect to such targeted, selfconscious discussions.
67
The Conference Committee report is quoted in full. See supra text accompanying note 15 The
Court subsequently declined to rely on this override history, which led to a second override on the
same point of law. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
68
See Widiss, supra note 2, at 885–86 (quoting a House Judiciary Committee Report stating that
the Committee intends for related statutes to be interpreted consistently with Title VII as amended).
The Court in Gross ignored this legislative history.
69
See supra note 16 and accompanying text. The Court rejected relying on this legislative history,
and instead construed the 1990 override text as altering pre-existing law in additional respects.
Compare Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 567–71 (2005) (Kennedy, J.),
with id. at 572–77 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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A third factor affecting probative weight is whether the override
commentary is consistent with the larger purpose or thrust of the statute. In
the 1991 Civil Rights Act, Congress overrode or modified as many as eleven
Supreme Court decisions in a single law.70 Congress also made clear in text
that one of its main purposes was to respond to these recent Court decisions
―by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide
adequate protection to victims of discrimination.‖ 71 This expansive
remedial framework should not be enough on its own to overcome
unequivocal evidence of a narrower legislative intent regarding a particular
court decision, as set forth in text or case-specific override commentary. At
the same time, when Congress expresses a broad-based determination to
undo constraints imposed by the Court in an entire area of law, that larger
purpose should tilt the interpretive scales, especially when it is consistent
with clearly expressed override commentary on the disapproved decision.72
Finally, there are certain overarching limits on the weight attributable to
override commentary. One is an override text that expresses in positive
terms—not through negative inferences from gaps or ambiguities—the
precise contours or limits of Congress‘s disapproval. 73 Another is the
applicability of the substantive canon of constitutional avoidance. If
construing an override text and accompanying commentary one way would
raise serious doubts as to its constitutionality, and an alternative construction
is not plainly contrary to Congress‘s intent, the Court may choose the
alternative even if the ―avoided‖ construction has some support in the

70

See Ruth Colker, The Mythic 43 Million Americans With Disabilities, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1, 17 & n.60 (2007) (listing nine decisions overridden by the Civil Rights Act of 1991). Two more
decisions were overridden in the 1991 Act. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166,
§§ 109, 113(b), 105 Stat. 1071, 1077–79 (amending Title VII so that it applies extraterritorially,
thereby overriding the Court‘s holding in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991),
and amending the statute that the Court held excluded expert fees in West Va. Univ. Hosps. v.
Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991), so that it explicitly includes expert fees).
71
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3(4), 105 Stat. 1071, 1071.
72
See Widiss, supra note 2, at 899–900. Conversely, if the override provision is a small and
discrete part of a larger statute with a separate thrust, then such purposive considerations should
carry less weight. See, e.g., Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603, 102 Stat.
4181, 4508 (overriding McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987), by defining ―a scheme or
artifice to defraud‖ to include ―a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of
honest services‖).
73
See Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, §§ 2, 7, 102 Stat. 28, 28, 31
(―The Congress finds that (1) certain aspects of recent decisions and opinions of the Supreme Court
have unduly narrowed or cast doubt upon the broad application of title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Age Discrimination Act of
1975, and title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; and (2) legislative action is necessary to restore
the prior consistent and long-standing executive branch interpretation and broad institution-wide
application of those laws as previously administered. . . . Nothing in the amendments made by this
Act shall be construed to extend the application of the Acts so amended to ultimate beneficiaries of
Federal financial assistance excluded from coverage before enactment of this Act.‖).
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legislative history.74 The avoidance canon has drawn criticism from judges
and scholars and it is surely susceptible to abuse. 75 Still, for present
purposes it is enough to observe that a court faithfully seeking to avoid
invalidation of an override text may at times impose limits on the scope of
Congress‘s expressed intentions.76
IV. Conclusion
In two well-crafted articles, Professor Widiss has unmasked the Court‘s
recent pronounced tendency to disrespect Congress in the override setting.
Her critique of the Gross decision is devastatingly effective, and in her
proposed solution, she is inclined to privilege congressional signals over
judicial ones when construing the scope and meaning of override text.77 My
Response has built on her inclination, arguing that override legislative history
is entitled to special weight when contrasted with textual silence and
language canons. The fact that some justices are unwilling to consider this
(or any other) legislative history is disturbing but hardly dispositive. From
the perspective of legislative supremacy and judicial responsibility, it is time
to renounce such zeal in the override context.

74

See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S.
568, 575–78 (1988).
75
See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 53, at 285; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, QuasiConstitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593,
640–45 (1992) (criticizing the Court for selectively using the clear statement rule to protect some
constitutional values but not others); Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REV.
71, 74 (1995) (lamenting the fact that interpreting a statute to avoid constitutional questions
frequently results in an interpretation that the drafters would not have preferred).
76
See Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2927–31 (2010) (construing an override
amendment of a wire-fraud statute to avoid unconstitutional vagueness by limiting the amendment
to cover only bribes and kickbacks rather than the wider honest-services category that Congress
intended).
77
See Widiss, supra note 2, at 933.

